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THE ELECTION COMMISSION:
ISSUES AND TRENDS OF THE PAST DECADE
Shilpa Bhandarkar*
The fact that free and fair elections are basic and fundamental to any
democracy needs no further elaboration. I In this respect, Article 324 of the Indian
Constitution envisages the existence of an independent and impartial Election
Commission (EC) that will direct, control and conduct the elections of the President,
Vice-President, Parliament and the Legislature of every State of India.
While drafting the Constitution, members of the Constituent Assembly observed the fact that no other Constitution made such elaborate provisions with
respect to elections and its details.2 It is well remarked that "the fact that detailed
provisions in this regard have been made shows how anxious the Constitution makers had been to safeguard this political rights as an integral part of
the Constitution itself.,,3
In a decade in which almost no government had been able to successfully
complete its term in office, and the electorate is preparing itself to go to the polls
yet again, the EC is back in the limelight. In this context it is important to examine
the two important judgments of the 1990s that have directly affected the working
of the EC, S.S. Dhanoa v. Union of India4 and T.N. Seshan v. Union of India.5

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DHANOA CASE
On 7th October 1989, the President issued a notification, in the exercise of
his powers under Article 324(2), fixing the number of Election Commissioners

*

III Year, National Law School ofIndia University, Bangalore.
Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad: "Election is a most important item in a democratic set-up and it is very
necessary that it should be controlled and supervised by a very competent, independent and
impartial body". CAD Vol. VIII, p. 923. See also T.N. Seshan, Chief Election Commissioner of
India v. Union of India, (1995) 4 see 611; Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1995 Supp.
see 1.

2

CAD, Vol. VIII, p. 915.

3

M.V. Pylee, Constitutional Government in India, p. 708 cited from J.e. Johari, Indian Government and Politics 795 (1984).

4

(1991) 3 see

567. Hereinafter referred to as Dhanoa's case.

5

(1995) 4 see

611. Hereinafter referred to as Seshan's case.

National Law School Journal

142

[1998

(ECrs) other than the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) at two.6 S.S. Dhanoa
and V.S. Seigell were appointed ECrs by a subsequent notification dated 16th
October. On the same day, rules were made to regulate the conditions of service
and tenure of office of the ECrs, one such condition being that an ECr would hold
office for a term of 5 years or till the age of 65 years, whichever is earlier. On 1st
January 1990, the President issued two notifications under Article 324(2), rescinding, with immediate effect, the notifications of 7th and 16th October respectively.
The latter notification was challenged in this case on the ground that an ECr
is entitled to continue in office for his full tenure as determined by rules made
under Article 324(5) of the Constitution. The President can remove an ECr only
on the recommendation of the CEC. In the absence of such recommendation, the
President has no power to cut short the tenure either under the Constitution or
under the rules. Additionally, an interference, either direct or indirect, with the
working of a body such as the EC, whose independence is vital to the conduct of
elections in democracy, is prima facie unconstitutional.
The State argued that the power of the President under Article 324(2) to
determine the strength of the EC and fix the number of ECrs from time to time, is
unfettered. The exercise of the said power is based on the subjective satisfaction
of the President formed on the advice tendered by his Council of Ministers. Further, it was contended that this was not a case of removal from service, but of
termination of service consequent upon the abolition of the post.
The Supreme Court upheld the abolition of the posts ofECr, highlighting the
differences between the CEC and the other ECrs.
i)

It was not the drafters of the Constitution to give the same status to the CEC
and the other ECrs7 - the CEC was to be in overall control of the running and
administration of the Commission.

ii)

While the appointment of the CEC is mandatory, the appointment of the
other ECrs is not. 8

6

The very need for 2 additional ECrs could be questioned. The reason stated was handle the
additional work likely to be generated on account of lowering the voting age from 21 years to
18 years. The reason itself appears to be weak on 2 grounds: (i) In 1950, when the electoral rolls
had to be prepared for the first time, there was only one CEC and no other ECrs, and the work
generated then far exceeded the present case; (ii) The additional work could have been handled
by increasingthe staffratherthanappointingtwoECrs.

7

Supra. n. 4, at para 11. See also Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VIII, p. 905.

8

Supra. n. 4, at para 6.
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iii)

The conditions of service of the CEC, at the time, were on par with a judge
of the Supreme Court,9 while the other ECrs had been placed on par with
judges of the High Court.

iv)

There is a constitutional protection given to the CECIO in that his conditions
of service shall not be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment, and
that he shall not be removed from his office except in like manner and on like
ground as a judge of the Supreme Court. This was aimed at protecting the
independence of the CEC from political and/or executive interference. No
such protection is afforded to the other ECrs.
1I

The Court concluded that as the CEC was not the first among equals, but was
intended to be placed in a distinctly higher position, the abolition of the posts of
ECrs did not in any way affect the independence of the EC.
It is submitted that though the Supreme Court was perfectly right in pointing
out the difference in status between the CEC and the other ECrs, the conclusion
that it reached, that the abolition of the pOStSin no way affected the independence
of the EC, was erroneous.
The ECrs and Regional Election Commissioners (RECs) have been assured
independence of functioning by the constitutional protection under the second
proviso of Article 324(5) which provides that they cannot be removed except on
the recommendation of the CEC. The rationale of this was to ensure that the ECrs
and RECs are not at the mercy of the political or executive bosses of the day. It is
necessary to realize that this check on the executive's power safeguards not only
the functionaries, but the EC itself as a body. 12 However, this case has negated all
such protection of independence by giving the executive the power to create and
abolish the posts of ECr at will, thus completely by-passing the constitutional
provisions requiring the CEC's recommendation before removal, and taking away
any semblance of independent functioning that the ECrs and Regional Election
Commissioners (RECs) need to enjoy.

9

Ss. 3(1), 4(1 )(i), 6(2)(a), and 8(i) of The Chief Election Commissioner
Commissioners (Conditions of Service) Act, 1991.

and other Election

10 Proviso to Article 324(5) of the Constitution of India.
II

As laid down in Article 124(4) of the Constitution of India.

12 Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: ".... The object of this House is that all matter relating to Elections should
be outside the control of the Executive government of the day, (then) it is absolutely necessary
that the new machinery which we are setting up, namely the Ee, should be irremovable be the
Executive by a mere fiat." - CAD Vol. VIII, p. 906.

144

National Law School Journal

[1998

The Court also laid down that the creation and abolition of posts was the
prerogative of the executive, i3 and in the present case, the President's.
It must be pointed out that firstly, the concept of "prerogatives" has no place
in the Indian Constitution.14 Power cannot be equated with prerogative, as the
former carries with it accountability in its exercise while the latter does not. The
Constitution does not anywhere provide for the unguided or absolute exercise of
power, and hence the term "prerogative" itself is problematic.
Secondly, the Supreme Court has held time and again that the satisfaction of
the President is nothing but the satisfaction of the Council of Ministers and that
the advice of the latter is binding on the former. is In that case, the power to create
and abolish the posts of ECrs at will is left to the political party in power at any
given point of time. How then can one say that the independence of the EC is not
affected?
Lastly, merely the fact that the CEC occupies a position superior to that of
other ECrs does not in any way imply that the ECrs are not important in the functioning of the EC. Maintenance of security of tenure is necessary for the independent functioning of any body. If the ECrs have to work under threat that their office
could be abolished if the government in power at the time is displeased, surely it
cannot be said that the same does not affect the independence of the EC.
THE POLITICS SURROUNDING T.N. SESHAN
The whirlwind that was Seshan began with his refusal to hold elections in
certain areas until he was given sufficient staff, and the control over it, as the
Constitution demanded under Art. 324(6). The CEC had received complaints about
the law and order situation in these areas thereby making the conduct of elections
there problematic. He therefore asked the Central Government for appropriate
police forces so as to restore the law and order situation in these areas so that
elections could go on as planned. However, his request was denied. In retaliation,
Seshan issued an order on 2nd August 1991 to the effect that until his positions
and powers as CEC were decided upon, election would not be held.

I3

Supra n. 4 at para 25.

14

Under our constitution, there is no 'prerogative' in the technical sense. All constitutional powers are regulated by our written Constitution. There may be room for the development of conventions on a matter not fully covered as to the mode of exercise of a discretion or power. But
that is a matter distinct from 'prerogative' - M. C. Desai (ed.), Vankataramaiya's Law Lexicon
with Legal Maxims 1880 (1996).

15 Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831; R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1
SCC 248.
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The crux of the issue involved Art. 234(6) and its interpretation. The Centre
argued that Seshan had no powers to ask for staff. However, as Seshan rightly
pointed out,16 maintenance of law and order for the purpose of holding fair and
free election is the responsibility of the EC. Article 324(6) says that the President
or the Government shall make all staff necessary as requested by the EC. It does
not specify the category of staffI7 and hence there was no bar on the CEC asking
for police staff to enable the EC to conduct the elections.
When the High Courts stayed the operation of the order, the CEC approached
the Supreme Court, which, in an interim order, held that the CEC had the "high
and exclusive jurisdiction to oversee fair and free elections", and noted that the
perceptions of the EC of the law and order situations and its decision for ensuring
the free and fair polls "in the light of those perceptions should not be lightly interfered with.,,18
On 24th September 1993, the CEC started a fresh controversy by questioning the V.P. Singh government's appointment of Rama Devi as 'officiating CEC'
in November 1990 when the then CEC Peri Shastri had proceeded on leave. They
demanded its cancellation retrospectively. Seshan pointed out that during the period in which he holds the office of CEC, no other person can be appointed to
officiate in his place even if he goes on leave of any kind or is not in a position to
discharge his duties for any reason whatsoever. 19The Constitution nowhere envisages the appointment of any 'officiating CEC' when there is an incumbent to that
office and hence the appointment of Rama Devi was in clear violation of the Constitution and the laws and was totally void from the beginning.

16 Sachidananda Murthy, "I am Tough - Interview with T.N. Seshan", The Week, 15th August
1993, pp. 36-7.
17

Further, this staff is brought under the Commission's disciplinary control as per the 1988
amendment to the S. 13-CC of the Representation of the People Act, 1951:
S. 13-CC. Chief Electoral Officers, District Election Officers etc., deemed to be on deputation to
Election Commission - The officers referred to in this Part and any other officer or staff employed in connection with the preparation, revision and correction of the electoral rolls for, and
the conduct of, all elections shall be deemed to be on deputation to the Election Commission for
the period during which they are so employed and such officers and staff shall, during that
period, be subject to the control, superintendence and discipline of the Election Commission. 1989 II CCL 249. (emphasis added)
See also Election Commission of India v. State Bank of India Staff Association Local Head Office
Unit, Patna, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 13.

18 Anand Sahay, "Winner of Recognition", The Hindu, dt. 16th January 1994, p. 7.
19

"Seshan seeks cancellation of appointment of 'officiating' CEC", Deccall Herald, 25th August,
1993.
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Rumours that moves were on to clip Seshan' s wings were making the rounds
by this time. Hence when on October 1st, 1993 the Union Government converted
the EC into a multi-member body by appointing 2 more ECrs, with the status
equivalent to that of a Supreme Court judge for all the three and equal powers, no
one was really surprised. Seshan himself was not informed of the same until after
the appointments were made and even then by his staff and not the government or
President as general rules of conduct would demand.20
There is nothing novel about the move. Even earlier, when the then CEC,
Peri Shastri demonstrated a degree of independence, the Union government
promptly appointed 2 additional ECrs. It is not surprising that the central government would resort to the same measure in order to curtail Seshan's powers.
Thereafter, the sequence of events can be summarized as follows: Under Art.
123(1), the President promulgated The Chief Election Commissioner and Other
Election Commissioners (Conditions of Service) Amendment Ordinance, which
brought about the following changes:
1.

Changed the long title to "Election Commission (Conditions of Service of
Election Commissioners and Transaction of Business) Act, 1991.

2.

Equated the CEC and the other ECrs in terms of their salaries, pensions, and
conditions of service.

3.

Made the retirement age of ECrs also 65 years, as was the case with the CEC.

4.

Introduced a new chapter regulating the transaction of business of the EC
whereby all business was to be transacted unanimously, failing which the
majority decision would prevail.

On 1st October 1993, under Art. 324(2), the President fixed the number of
ECrs other than the CEC at two, and by further notification, M.S. Gill and V.G.
Krishnamurthy were appointed as ECrs. Three petitions challenging the 1993 Ordinance came up for hearing on 15th November 1993. The Supreme Court issued
an ad-interim order to the effect that:
"The CEC may ascertain the views of other Commissioners or such of them
as he chooses ... However, he will not be bound by their views. It is also
made clear that the CEC alone will be entitled to issue instructions to the

20

On 1st October 1992, the CEC, Seshan, was about to leave his residence in Delhi for Pune when
he got a call from the EC headquarters. He was informed by his staff "that 2 gentlemen had come
over claiming that they had been appointed ECs." - Aditi Phadnis, "Reining in Seshan", Sunday,
17th October 1993, p. 16.
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Commission's staff as well as the outside agencies and that no other Commissioner will issue such instructions.,,21
The Ordinance was passed in the form of an Act on 4th January 1994 without any change.
UNDERSTANDING

SESHAN'S CASE

T.N. Seshan, one of the people who had filed a writ petition, challenged the
validity of the Ordinance and Act on the following four grounds:
1.

The Presidential Ordinance converting the single-member EC into a multimember commission was issued male fide, the sole aim of which was to curb
the independence ofT.N. Seshan.

The Constitution clearly provides for the possibility of a multi-member commission and therefore the creation of the same is not unconstitutional per se. However, the very fact that the words "if any" were incorporated into Article 324(2)
belies the fact that it is merely an enabling provision which can be well left unused. In other words, plurality is not "writ large on the face of Article 324(2)" as
observed by the judges,22 but merely provided for as an option.23
However, while the author concedes that the constitutionality of a multimember EC was not at issue, it was the mala fides of such conversions that was
questioned, and it was this very issue that the Supreme Court failed to address.
Firstly, there is the question of whether mala fides can be pleaded at all. The
Supreme Court noted that, "it is not permitted to plead malice,,24 (even though it
did later go, into the charges of the same), a contention that the author questions.
Since the Court has repeatedly held that the President is merely a 'nominal' head
and always bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers (under Art. 74),25in
effect it said that mala fides cannot be attributed to governments. Why not? Why
is it "wrong to think" that the 2 ECrs were appointed for the purpose of eroding the
independence of the CEC? Can it be confidently said that the idea of controlling

21

Supra, n. 5, at para 3.

22

Supra, n. 5, at para 12.

23

Ramaswamy Iyer, "The Election Commission and the Judgment", EPW, Vol. 31, No. I, p. 37.

24

Supra. n. 5, at 339.

25

Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831; R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1
SCC 248; K.A. Mathialagan v. The Governor, AIR 1973 Mad 198; State ofTravancore, Cochin
v. Bombay and Company Ltd., AIR 1955 SC 160; etc.
Since it is not the President who acts independently, the opinion/decision of the Council of
Ministers is what gets reflected or translated in the Ordinance. Hence, the validity of an Ordinance or Act may be suspect.
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the independence ofthe CEC never occurred to the government despite the political scenari026 at the time?
Secondly, was there mala fides on the part of the government at all? It is
submitted that the Supreme Court never even went into this question, but nevertheless concluded that they had examined the same and found no merit in it. The
judges referred to various actions of Seshan, such as TV appearances, interviews,
'abrasive' public utterances and concluded: "In this back drop, if the government
thought that a multi-member body was desirable, the government was certainly
not wrong and its action cannot be described as malafide".27 What do public appearances and newspaper interviews of the CEC have to do with the need to enlarge the strength of the EC? Nothing. The author fails to see a reasonable nexus
between the amount of publicity the CEC was getting at the time and the need to
appoint two more ECrs. Surely, that was not the purpose of Art. 324(2).
It is therefore clear that despite a lengthy discussion, the charges of mala
fides was not really considered at all in the judgment, but was been rejected because the judges obviously approved of the government's actions.28
2.

The Ordinance, which equated the status of the CEC with that of the other
ECrs, was unconstitutional for the same reason.

Seshan contended that the ordinance regulating the terms and conditions of
service of the ECrs equated them with the CEC, and that in itself was unconstitutional. However, when dealing with the comparative status of the CEC and the
other ECrs, the Supreme Court did a total volte-face from its stand in Dhanoa's
case. It is submitted that while the Constitution makes no reference to 'status', it
envisages 3 areas of difference between the CEC and other ECrs: permanency of
tenure, procedure for removability and conditions of service. While in Dhanoa's
case the court reached the conclusion that these differences mitigate against the
other ECrs being of the same status as that of the CEC, the present judgment
quotes
the same reasons but goes on to the reach a completely opposite conclu•
29
slOn.
26

Also, the extraordinary haste with which the Ordinance was passed while the CEC was in Pune
and the urgency with which one of the appointees, M.S. Gill was called back to Delhi by speical
aircraft betrayed the keenness on the part of the ruling party to install the 2 newly appointed
ECrs. If their motives were innocent, why such a rush? Supra. n. 20, at p. )7.

27

Supra. n. 5, at para 30.

28

Supra. n. 20. at p. 38.

29

In para 17 of the judgment, the Court agrees that i) the CEC is the only permanent incumbent in
the EC ii) the staff of the EC would have to function under the direction and guidance of the
CEC iii) the CEC shall act as the Chairman of a multi-member Commission. Yet the Court
held that the CEC and the other ECrs are at par with each other.
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The Court held that the difference in regard to removability is not an indication for conferring higher status on the CEC. It is interesting to note in this regard
that even a judge does not have the right to recommend the dismissal of his colleagues. Yet, this power has been vested in the CEC by the Constitution itself. It is
submitted that the CEC is a permanent incumbent and the ECrs are temporarily
brought into being by a presidential order, and if for their protection the ECrs
depend on the "protective umbrella,,30 of the CEC, the conclusion seems inescapable that the Constitution places the CEC above the other ECrs. However the
judgment denies this.3!
How then did the judges reach such a stand? An indication is found in their
observation that "It would be wrong to project an individual and eclipse the BC. ..
to project the individual as mightier than the institution would be a grave mistake."n However, this is precisely what they did. Overlooking the fact that the
question was not whether Seshan was above Gill or Krishnamurthy, but whether
the CEC is above the other ECrs. The CEC is not an individual but an institution,
as much as the EC is, and in trying to correct what they considered to the publicity
driven Seshan, the judges did exactly what they accused Seshan of doing - confused individuals and institutions.33
3.

Neither the Government nor the Parliament had any jurisdiction to lay down
how the business of the EC should be conducted. Even if they did, the principle of decision-making by majority was unworkable.

The Court held that once the constitution of a multi-member EC was upheld,
"the provisions incidental thereto cannot be challenged.,,34 However, it is submitted that the manner of transaction of business of the EC cannot be considered
"incidental" to the power to regulate the service conditions of the ECrs. Further,
where the drafters of the Constitution wanted the Parliament to legislate on a subject, they have specifically provided for the same, as in Article 324(5). Hence,
applying the maxim expressio unis est exclusis alterius, it can be concluded that
the power to make laws regulating the manner of transaction of business of the BC
is outside the purview of the Parliament.

30

Supra. n. 5, para 16.

31

Supra. n. 20, at p. 39.

32

Supra. n. 5, at p. 338.

33

Supra. n. 20, at p. 39.

34

Supra. n. 5, at para 32.
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Comi ng to the second question of the workability of this rule35it is submitted
that in the exercise of administrative functions, i.e., the running of the Commission itself, someone has to be regarded as the administrative head, and this can
only be the CEC.
The Court opined that if the ECrs could only advicse the CEC and the latter
retained the final decision-making power, the former would rendered "non-functional or ornamental.,,36 Can it not be said that if the CEC has no independent
powers of decision-making, then it is he who is rendered functionless and ornamental?37 Further, giving advice in itself is an important function, integral to the
decision making process. For example, when the Supreme Court exercises its advisory opinion under Art. 143, the final decision making power still vests with the
President. Though the Supreme Court in this case functions only as an advisory
body, it cannot be said that the Supreme Court's role is merely "ornamental,,?38
Either way, this is not the main issue. The crucial question is whether the
"majority wins" principle is reconcilable with the special protection given to the
CEC. The court has held that the hypothetical possibility that the government
deliberately appoints ECrs who will combine to defeat the CEC on every issue, is
"not warranted".39 but have failed to explain why. Further, if one analyses the
wording of S. 10(3) of the Ordinance, it will be seen that the provision talks about
a difference of opinion between the CEC and the other ECrs, and not amongst the
same. The difference in connotation between the two sets of wordings that were
possible, and the one eventually chosen by the government, clearly indicate that
the intention of the government was a scenario in which the opinion of the CEC
was on one side, and that of the other ECrs on the other.
The problem with the majority principle is most clearly seen when one
analyzes who these people who are going to constitute the majority are: people
appointed by the government, who could just as easily be removed by the same.
They would owe allegiance more to the government that the EC, since it is only
the former that has the power to either keep or remove them from office. Further,

35

It should be noted that in the para 18 of Dhanoa 's case, the judges opined that "in the case such
as that of the EC which is not merely an advisory body but an executive one, it is difficult to
carryon unanimous decisions in all matters."

36

Supra. n. 5, at para 20.

37

Supra. n. 20, at p. 40.

38

Other examples of rendering of non-binding advice: Under Art. 76(2), the Attorney-General
advises the government; under Art. 124(2), the advice of the Chief Justice has to be taken
before the appointment of any juge.

39

Supra. n. 5, at para 22.
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after Dhanoa's case the government does not even have to go through the removal procedure at all; they can remove the ECrs from office by simply rescinding
the Act that brought them into being. Alternatively, whenever an ECr is showing
signs of independence, the government can always appoint more ECrs so as to
create a majority that will do its bidding. In such a scenario, is the majority rule
feasible to And more importantly, is it safe?
All the issues put forward - the validity of a multi-member EC, the status of
the CEC vis-a-vis the other ECrs, the workability of the majority rule - were all
independent of Seshan, the man. Despite this, the Court embarked on a detailed
account of his behaviour, his press coverage, his 'abrasive' manner, etc. This was
uncalled for, as it was not Seshan who was on trial before them in the first place. It
is thus obvious that the strong disapproval felt by the Court of Seshan' s behaviour
was a majority factor running through the judgment.
CONCLUSION
In Dhanoa's case the Supreme Court gave the right reasons but reached the
wrong conclusions. In Seshan's case however, both the reasoning as well as the
conclusions were wrong, amounting practically to a Constitutional amendment.
Seshan had some modest success in his attempt to transform the election scene in
the country,41 but clearly these were the first steps in a process which was bound
to be long and arduous. One would have expected the highest court of the land to
have strengthened the hands of such a person. Instead, the judges, angry at what
they considered an unseemly projection of personality, and so evidently anxious
to rescue the institution from an individual they disapproved of, virtually stripped
him of his standing and in doing so, unwittingly damaged not merely the man but
also the institution.
Article 324 suffers from certain structural flaws, namely:

*

The Constitution say nothing about the qualification of the CEC or the other
ECrs. Every matter in this connection is left to the jurisdiction of the President pending an appropriate enactment by the Union Legislature. It may be

40

Another problem that could arise is that, say a vacancy arises in the position of Election
Commissioner due to resignation, the retirement or other reasons and the EC is reduced to a 2member body. If there is a division in their decision making, what then? Would the Supreme
Court be referred to for approval or advice?

41

" ..... there is no gain saying that he (Seshan) has for the first time since independence, placed
the office of the EC on the map of democracy." - Sahay, supra, n. 22.
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feared that the President, while acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers, may appoint a person purely on the basis of political considerations.42

*

The Constitution say nothing about the number of RECs to be placed under
the control of the EC and their qualifications. The fear expressed above may
be harboured at this stage as well.

*

The EC, though entrusted with the enormous responsibility of conducting
elections to the Union and State legislatures, including the offices of the
President and the Vice President, has been denied the right to recruit and
regulate the conditions of service of its secretariat staff, a right available to
some other important functionaries of the State, like the two Houses of Parliament, the Supreme Court, the Union Public Service Commission, and the
Comptroller and Auditor-General of India.

The hidden dangers of Art. 324 seem to have escaped the attention of the
Supreme Court. While the EC remained a single-member body, and even when it
became a multi-member body, as long as the decision-making power was presumed to vest in the CEC, who was irremovable (hence) independent, there was
no problem. However, once the CEC is reduced to one among equals and is denied
any special authority, those dangers become very real.
The danger is simply this: Article 324 entrusts the power of decision-making
to a body of persons who, with the exception of the CEC, are not immune from the
control and influence of the government. When the Court upheld the validity of
allowing the rule of "majority wins" in the functioning of the EC, it was in fact
allowing the rule of "majority, consisting of members appointed by the government and holding office at the pleasure of the same, wins". In other words, if the
appropriate government plans it such, it would be possible for it to practically run
the Ee.
The government could do one or more of 3 things: First, fix the number of
ECrs to pack the Commission to overrule all the decisions of the CEe. Second,
seek to control and influence the ECrs through its power to rescind the order that
brought them into being; or by fixing a specified term for the appointment and
granting or denying extensions. Third, by appointing persons whose objectivity
and uprightness cannot be relied upon.

42

For example, Trivedi's appointment as CEC was openly criticized by the Opposition parties.
R.V.S. Peri Shastri was criticized for holding only one by-election to favour the candidate and
leaving other vacancies unfilled. He was also in the midst of a controversy when he deferred
the Haryana elections in 1987 on the ground of law and order situations in that State but permitted the elections in Meghalaya where the law order situation was no better.
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One cannot ignore the possibility of mala fides on the part of the government
- and that requires to be guarded against through appropriate Constitutional and
legislative amendments:
1.

A permanent multi-member Commission with a fixed number of ECrs should
be appointed. The protection from removability that only the CEC presently
enjoys should be extended to the other ECrs also.

2.

The appointment of the CEC and other ECrs should be made by the President
on consultation with the Chief Justice ofIndia only. Alternatively, the selection of all the ECrs should be taken out of the purview of the government and
entrusted to a high-level, non-partisan body and preferably passed by a 2/3
majority of both Houses of Parliament.43

3.

Since the CEC and the ECrs have to work together harmoniously, it would
appear essential to provide that any ECr, including RECs, shall be appointed,
if not in concurrence of, atleast in consultation with the CEC.44

4.

Impartiality and independence cannot be secured only by security of tenure.
It is also necessary to remove all prospects of future preferment. Surprisingly, there is no constitutiona145 or other legal prohibition against the government trying to influence the CEC with prospects of future employment.46
Such a provision resuires to be inserted to ensure the independence and impartial functioning of the CEC.

To secure the independence of the EC as a body the above amendments are
necessary. However, the question remains as to whether any government would
be motivated enough to carry through the same. But without them, the provisions
of Article 324 of the Constitution read with the judgements of the Supreme Court
leaves the position of the EC as tenuous.

43

In the Constituent Assembly Debates, it was also suggested that to really ensure the independence of the CEC, the appointment should be confirmed by 2/3 majority of both Houses (such
that it can be safely said that the candidate for that post of CEC enjoys the confidence of all
parties). - CAD, Vol. VIII, p. 908.

44

See also P.B. Venkatasubramaniam,
February, 1990.

45

In contrast to this, under Articles 148(4) and 319(a) of the Constitution respectively, the
Comptroller and Auditor-General and the Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission
are barred from any other subsequent office under the Central and State Governments.

46

For example, the appointment of S. P. Sen Verma to the Law Commission and that of R.K.
Trivedi as the Governor of Gujarat after retirement from the EC.
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